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Abstract
We argue that inﬂation-targeting strategy in practice can be approximated with the in-
terest rate responding to the unchanged-interest-rate forecast of inﬂation. We develop a
method to derive unchanged-interest-rate forecasts in forward-looking models and evaluate
the performance of the policy rule in an optimizing New Keynesian model due to Monacelli
(2003) estimated on UK data. We ﬁnd that the policy rule is less prone to generate a deter-
minate rational expectations equilibrium if based on an unchanged interest rate compared
to the rule-consistent forecast. The rule approximates the optimal commitment policy if the
central bank attaches suﬃcient weight to inﬂation as opposed to output gap stabilization.
The optimal forecast horizon is robustly close to one and a half year.
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The arguably poor performance and robustness of ﬁxed exchange rate systems and monetary
targeting has resurrected the belief in more activist policy throughout the 1990s. Such activism
is normally associated with the central bank’s discretionary use of the interest rate in order
to steer policy directly toward price stability, in the sense of low and stable inﬂation. Such
a framework is often referred to as inﬂation targeting. Inﬂation targeting has been formally
introduced in several countries, e.g., New Zealand, Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
Australia, Norway and Iceland, where the central banks have been given explicit targets for
inﬂation and the instrument independence to set the interest rate so as to achieve the inﬂation
target.
In the paper we shall interpret inﬂation targeting as a forecast-feedback rule for the interest
rate in which the deviations of the forecast of inﬂation at some horizon from the target level is
the prominent indicator. If the inﬂation forecast is above (below) the inﬂation target, the central
bank sets a contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy stance, i.e., by setting interest rate
above (below) its natural rate or moving the interest rate in steps towards this target rate.
With respect to the practical relevance of such rules, several central banks use such a pro-
cedure to guide policy. Sveriges Riksbank (1999) Inﬂation Report 3/99, p.58 states:
“Monetary policy is sometimes described with a simple rule of thumb: if the overall
picture of inﬂation prospects (based on an unchanged repo rate) indicates that in
twelve to twenty-four months’ time inﬂation will deviate from the target, then the
repo rate should normally be adjusted accordingly.” (My italics)
Jansson and Vredin (2000) interprets the procedure of monetary policymaking at Sveriges
Riksbank’s as the use of UIF rules.
Svein Gjedrem, the Governor of the Central Bank of Norway, states
“The key rate is set on the basis of an overall assessment of the inﬂation outlook
two years ahead. If it appears that inﬂation will be higher than 2 per cent with
unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased. If it appears that
inﬂation will be lower than 2 per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest
rate will be reduced.” (Gjedrem, 2002) (My italics)
Accordingly, there are reasons to believe that this procedure approximate how inﬂation
targeting is carried out in practice.1 Although forecast-feedback rules have been analyzed
previously (see discussion in the next section), they have been analyzed using rule-consistent
forecast and not based upon an unchanged-interest-rate assumption, which according to the
quotations seems to be the more relevant one.
1An alternative interpretation is oﬀered by Leitemo (2000), where I study the eﬀects of setting the interest
rate so as to have the constant-interest-rate forecast of inﬂation equal to target at some given horizon.
1This paper presents a method of analyzing forecast-feedback rule that are based upon
unchanged-interest-rate forecast of inﬂation in models with forward-looking behavior.2 More-
over, it provides an analysis of such rules in an empirical version of an optimizing open-economy
New Keynesian model estimated on UK data, and contrast the results to the outcome of rules
based upon policy-consistent forecasts of inﬂation.
We ﬁnd that both strategies may be eﬃcient in reducing a combination of inﬂation and
output gap variability, although they generally stabilize inﬂation too much and the output
gap too little. Both type of rules are prone to yield an indeterminate rational expectations
equilibrium at long forecast horizons. The use of unchanged-interest-rate forecasts, however,
makes the rules even more prone to indeterminacy. Although the interest rate assumption for the
forecast have little eﬀect if the forecast period is short, the assumption plays a crucial diﬀerence
for horizons of six quarters and above, horizons lengths that seems relevant in practical monetary
policymaking. The relevancy of the rule are underscored by the result that the optimal horizon
is robustly close to six and seven quarters, a forecast horizon that corresponds closely to what
is implemented in practice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the general charac-
teristics of inﬂation targeting and the intuition behind the forecast-feedback inﬂation-targeting
strategy. Section 3 presents a New Keynesian model of a small open economy due to Monacelli
(2003) with both the domestic goods producers and ﬁrms importing goods from abroad experi-
encing rigidities in price setting. Section 4 presents the stabilization properties of the two types
of policy rules and discuss the best choice of the forecast-feedback horizon. Finally, Section 5
provides a conclusion.
2. The monetary policy framework
In several papers, Svensson (1997, 1999b, 2000) deﬁnes strict inﬂation targeting as a monetary
policy strategy that discretionarily uses all available information in minimizing the uncondi-
tional variance of inﬂation around a given target level. Flexible inﬂation targeting means that
the central bank also targets other variables, such as output, although to a lesser degree, by
minimizing a weighted average of the unconditional variances of the target variables. Assum-
ing that the central bank targets output and minimizes the change in the interest rate (i.e.,
interest-rate smoothing) in addition to the inﬂation rate itself, the period loss function is given
by
Lt =( 1− λ)(¯ πt − π∗)2 + λy2
t + ν(∆it)2, (1)
where ¯ π is the four-quarter consumer price (CPI) inﬂation rate, π∗ is the inﬂation target, y is
the output gap, that is, the percentage deviation of actual output from the natural rate, ∆i
2See also the discussion in Svensson (1999a) regarding the appropriateness of the unchanged-interest-rate
inﬂation forecast as an indicator.
2is the quarterly change in the short-term interest rate, considered to be the policy instrument,
λ ∈ [0,1] and ν ≥ 0 are the relative weights attached by the monetary policymaker to output
versus inﬂation stabilization objective and interest-rate smoothing respectively. The central
bank’s problem is then to minimize the unconditional expected loss, i.e.,
minELt, (2)
subject to the model of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Although this deﬁnition of targeting has attractive theoretical properties, not least from
an optimal control perspective, the practical implementation of policy using such a procedure
may present several problems. First, there is little consensus on how the economy works. Two
diﬀerent descriptions of the economy may lead to mutually inconsistent policy recommendations.
Indeed, optimal policy in a given model may produce a disastrous outcome in another.3 Another
problem posed by optimal control is that, given that our models only use a (small) portion of
available information, incorporating information that is external to the model in the policy
decisions may be of considerable interest. In practice, however, such information is diﬃcult to
formalize. Integrating it with information provided by formal models, and exploiting it, may
be diﬃcult.
A third problem is related to the presence of forward-looking behavior in the model. The
optimal policy with forward-looking behavior is in most circumstances time-inconsistent. That
is, the policy requires an appropriate commitment today to policy tomorrow in order to inﬂuence
agents expectations so as to get the best possible trade-oﬀ between policy targets both across
and within periods.4 The central bank is normally not assumed to possess the ability to commit
to complex policy rules.
There is therefore focus on achieving the goals of monetary policy through simpler and
more transparent procedures, to which the central bank may be able to commit. Indeed, an
alternative way of deﬁning inﬂation targeting is that the instrument of the central bank responds
to measures of inﬂation (forecast) deviation from the target level. In order to keep these two
deﬁnitions separate, we follow Batini and Nelson (2001) in describing the alternative procedures
of implementing inﬂation targeting as inﬂation forecast-feedback rules as opposed to the optimal
control procedures. If r is the policy interest rate, measured as a deviation from its unconditional
(steady-state) value, a representation of the feedback rule is
rt = ρrrt−1 +( 1− ρr)βπ [Et¯ πt+H − π∗]. (3)
The interest rate as deviation from the equilibrium rate responds to the H quarter forecast of
3Recently, Hansen and Sargent (2003) have developed optimal control methods for situations where the con-
troller doubts the assumed model and wants policy to be robust to the assumed model deviating from the true
(unknown) model.
4See Svensson and Woodford (1999) for a more detailed treatment.
3(four-quarter) CPI inﬂation rate (Et¯ πt+H). We denote the rule in (3) as the policy-consistent
forecast feedback rule, or PCF rule for short. H is the forecast-feedback horizon. The forecast
feedback horizon should be distinguished from the policy target horizon, i.e., the expected time
before inﬂation has returned to its target level (see also Batini and Nelson, 2001).5
PCF rules have been discussed extensively in the literature. Batini and Haldane (1999)
argues that the rule is “lag encompassing”, i.e, takes account of the fact that monetary policy
works with a lag on inﬂation by focussing on the inﬂation forecast. By responding to the
forecast of inﬂation suﬃciently ahead, it ensures that policy is responding preemptively to those
inﬂationary shocks that monetary policy may indeed counteract. The policy rule includes the
inﬂation forecast as an indicator and therefore embodies all relevant information about future
information. The rule is therefore “information encompassing”. Finally, they show that the rule
within a small forward-looking macroeconomic model the rule does a good job in stabilizing both
inﬂation and output (i.e., rule is “output encompassing”) without causing too strong movements
in the interest rate. Batini and Nelson (2001) evaluates the rule in both a vector autoregressive
model (VAR) and a small forward-looking macroeconomic model and ﬁnd that the optimized
rule perform close to the optimal commitment policy. The optimal forecast-feedback horizon
is however very dependent upon the model, being two quarters for the forward-looking model
and as long as ﬁfteen quarters for the VAR model. Levin et al. (2001) study the PCF rule
in ﬁve models of the US economy and ﬁnd although that the optimized rule does a good job
in stabilizing inﬂation, the rule does a worse job in stabilizing output (i.e, rule is not output
encompassing). However, by extending the rule to include the output gap as an indicator, an
appropriately calibrated rule not only stabilizes output more eﬃciently, but also become more
robust to model uncertainty, i.e., works well in all ﬁve models.
In this study we ﬁnd that the PCF rule does a good job in stabilizing inﬂation appropriately,
but lacks the output encompassing properties claimed by Batini and Haldane (1999), thus
supporting and extending the result in Levin et al. (2001) to the open economy. The optimal
forecast-feedback horizon is robustly found to be six or seven quarters, close to the forecast-
feedback horizon used by many inﬂation-targeting central banks.
If the horizon employed in producing the inﬂation forecast is longer than the control lag of
the policy instrument, the forecast depends not only on the present stance of policy, but also
on the future policy stance. There is hence a need for conditioning the forecast on a particular
policy over the forecast-feedback horizon. The usual way to proceed is to condition on expected
policy, i.e., produce a rule-consistent forecast of inﬂation. This is the approach taken by Batini
and Haldane (1999), Batini and Nelson (2001) and Levin et al. (2001). Although this assumption
ensures consistency, it may be somewhat unrealistic from a practical point of view. Forecasts
5The forecast-feedback horizon and the policy target horizon will only coincide when the length of the horizon
is such that inﬂation will have returned to the target rate of inﬂation without any reactions by the monetary
authority to the state of the economy, i.e., the interest rate is kept constant at its equilibrium value. In this case,
πt+h|t = π
∗ = π
e,a n dit = i
e = r
e+π
e, where superscript e denotes an equilibrium value and r is the short-term
real interest rate.
4that are based on assumptions about speciﬁc future interest rate changes may be of little
guidance to the interest rate decision body that may have a hard time just deciding about the
present interest-rate stance. Svensson (1999a) argues that the forecast should be based on an
unchanged interest rate. This allows the decision body to focus on current interest rate setting,
and not having to form expectations about future interest rate decisions. Moreover, Svensson
argues that it may be easier to incorporate outside-of-the-model information under such a
procedure. The reason being that such information may take the form of the policymakers’
judgment regarding non-modelled factors that inﬂuence the forecast of inﬂation, given that the
policy stance remains unchanged.
Equation (3) may be reformulated along these lines to
rt = ρrrt−1 +( 1− ρr)βπ [Etπ(¯ rt−1)t+H − π∗], (4)
where Et¯ π(¯ it−1)t+h is the four-quarter CPI inﬂation forecast contingent on the interest rate
remaining unchanged over the forecast-feedback horizon, equal to the rate in the previous period.
Equation (4) can be denoted an unchanged-interest-rate inﬂation forecast-feedback rule,o rU I F
rule, for short. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) examine interest rate rules where the interest
rate reacts to the unchanged-interest-rate forecast of inﬂation in a backward-looking model of
the U.S. economy and ﬁnd that it performs close to the optimal policy.
2.1. Constructing unchanged-interest-rate forecasts in forward-looking models
This paper is the ﬁrst to consider UIF rules in forward-looking models. The construction
of conditional forecasts in forward-looking models require some comments. Forward-looking
variables are at least partially determined by expectations about future actions, by some or all
of the agents in the model. Since the forecast of inﬂation is the prominent indicator for the
interest rate, the unchanged-interest-rate assumption will inﬂuence current and expected future
interest-rate setting and therefore the forward-looking variables.
It is important to note that the unchanged-interest-rate assumption is merely an assumption
that is invoked in the construction the forecast, not the rationally expected interest-rate setting
with a UIF rule. In order to see this, consider the following example where we assume for
simplicity that there is no structural interest-rate inertia, setting ρr = 0. Moreover, assume
that in period 1, an unchanged-interest-rate produces a inﬂation forecast that is above the
inﬂation target, and the interest rate is therefore set above its steady-state value (of 0). In
period 2, the interest rate is changed if the new unchanged-interest-rate forecast deviation from
the inﬂation target is diﬀerent from that in the previous period. The interest rate only remains
unchanged in the rare cases where the deviation is unchanged. Rational agents will therefore
normally expect the unchanged-interest-rate assumption not to be met, but instead base their
interest rate expectations about the policy implications of the rule.
5In a setting with symmetric information between the private sector and the policymaker, the
private sector will simultaneously predict the policymaker’s interest-rate response, as the policy-
maker predicts private-sector behavior, and interest-rate setting will in itself not cause an ’jump’
in the forward-looking variables since it does not reveal any new information about the future.
In designing the unchanged-interest-rate forecast of inﬂation, the (equilibrium values of the)
forward-looking variables are therefore treated as predetermined. Note, however, that the equi-
librium value of the forward-looking variables depend on the rationally expected future policy,
not on the unchanged-interest-rate assumption. Hence, the unchanged-interest-rate forecasts
are partly based on the policy rule itself and partly the unchanged-interest-rate assumption.
Appendix A gives a formal treatment of how to incorporate UIF rule in forward-looking models
with a state-space representation.6
3. A New Keynesian model with imperfect exchange-rate pass-through
In order to evaluate the inﬂation forecast-feedback rules we need a model of the economy.
Recently, Monacelli (2003) has developed a model of a small open economy with optimizing
agents in a setting with imperfect pass-through of the exchange rate onto the domestic currency
price of foreign goods. The economy is populated by inﬁnitely-lived households, consuming
domestic and imported goods. The domestic ﬁrms produce a diﬀerentiated good and set their
prices in a monopolistic competitive market. Similarly, importing ﬁrms buy their goods at world
market prices and set the domestic-currency price of their goods in the domestic market. All
ﬁrms are subject to Calvo (1983) type price setting that gives rise to a supply functions in the
familiar form of forward-looking Phillips curve.
In the following, we give a brief presentation of the log-linearized version of the Monacelli
model, with coeﬃcient being policy-invariant functions of utility and technology parameters.
For details, we refer the reader to Monacelli (2003).
Domestic aggregate supply is described by a New Keynesian Phillips curve of the form
πH
t = βEtπH





t−1 is the rate of price inﬂation on goods produced domestically in period t,
xt is the output gap, the percentage deviations of output from the ﬂexible-price level of output
and ψF,t ≡ et+p∗
t −pF,t is the percentage deviations of world price on foreign goods (i.e., et+p∗
t,
where et is the nominal exchange rate and p∗
t is the foreign currency price of the foreign goods)
from the domestic price on the foreign goods, denoted as the law-of-one-price (LOP) gap.
CPI inﬂation, πt ≡ pt − pt−1, is a weighted average of domestic and foreign goods price
6Appendix B shows similarly how to incorporate PCF rule in a state-space representation of a forward-looking
model.
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t−1 is the rate of price inﬂation on imported goods and ∆st ≡ πF
t − πH
t is
the rate of change in the terms of trade.





The uncovered interest parity condition determines the nominal exchange rate, i.e.,
et = Etet+1 − rt + r∗
t, (4)
where rt and r∗
t are the risk-free domestic and foreign short-term nominal interest rates, respec-
tively.
It is useful to point out that there is a deﬁnitional correspondence between the real exchange
rate, qt ≡ et + p∗
t − pt, and the law-of-one-price gap, which is given by
ψF
t ≡ et + p∗
t − pF
t ,
= et + p∗
t − pt − (1 − γ)(pF
t − pH
t ),
= qt − (1 − γ)st. (5)
The demand for the (aggregated) domestic product, represented by the output gap, is given
by
xt = Etxt+1 − χ(rt − EtπH
t − rrt)+δEt(∆ψF
t+1). (6)
where the natural real interest rate, rrt, is given by
rrt ≡ φEt∆y∗
t+1 + θzt, (7)
where z is a domestic productivity shock and y∗ is world output.
3.1. The empirical speciﬁcation
Although the above theoretical framework gives a canonical representation of private sector
behavior in an economy where goods prices are subject to stickiness, the framework abstracts
from possible information and implementation lags that may give rise to gradual adjustment
present in the real world. Such inertial responses may be rationalized and explained by agents
7using rule-of-thumb pricing (Christiano et al., 2001), and consumers being subject to habit
formation (Fuhrer, 2000). For these reasons, we follow Rudebusch (2002a,b) in allowing data
to determine the exact structure of leads and lags in the economy. Moreover, we allow the
equations to be subject to stochastic white-noise error terms, and all equations are estimated
with a (non-reported) intercept term. We estimate the model on UK data obtained from either
the national accounts or the IMF and OECD databases.
The Phillips curve for domestic inﬂation is estimated as
πH
t+1 = µHEt¯ πH




t−j + κxEtxt+1 + κψEtψF
t+1 + εt+1, (8)
where πH
t+1 is the quarterly percentage increase in the GDP deﬂator measured as an annual rate,
¯ πt ≡ 1
4
 3
j=0 πt−j is the four-quarter inﬂation rate. The estimation period is 1980Q1 − 2001Q4
and the model is estimated by GMM. We impose dynamic homogeneity, i.e.,
 3
j=0 αj =1 .T h e
LOP gap has been computed according to equation (5), using detrended eﬀective real exchange
rate and terms of trade.7 The terms of trade was derived as the percentage deviation between
the imported goods prices and the domestic price level. The share of imported goods in the
consumer basket is set at γ =0 .25.8 The output gap is detrended log GDP. As instruments
we used eight lags of the quarterly domestic inﬂation rate, fours lags of the deviations from the
law of one price, the output gap, UK 3-month interest rate, US federal funds rate and OECD





























¯ R2 =0 .67 σ =0 .02 DW =1 .60
Imported goods price inﬂation is estimated according to the form
πF
t+1 = µFEt¯ πF





t+1 + vt+1, (10)






t−j. The model was estimated over the period 1980Q1 − 2001Q4 using GMM. The
instruments are eight lags of imported goods price inﬂation and fours lags of the LOP gap,
the output gap, UK 3-month interest rate, US federal funds rate and OECD output gap. The
7All detrending was performed using a HP-ﬁlter with the smoothing parameters set at 1600.
8This corresponds to the value used in Batini and Haldane (1999) and is reasonable for a small open economy.



















t+1 + vt+1. (11)
¯ R2 =0 .46 σ =0 .06 DW =1 .92
The output gap is estimated as
xt+1 = µxEtxt+2 +( 1− µx)(ηxt +( 1− η)xt−1) − χ(rt − Et¯ πH




where y∗ is foreign output which is approximated by the OECD output gap. The instruments
used were four lags of quarterly domestic inﬂation rate, the LOP gap, the output gap, UK
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¯ R2 =0 .90 σ =0 .004 DW =2 .05
It is worth noting that we ﬁnd that both price setting and demand determination seem to
include both forward-looking and backward-looking elements in a signiﬁcant way. This conﬁrms
most of the results in the literature.
The uncovered interest parity condition was estimated assuming that the unobserved risk-












q,t−1 + wt (15)
¯ R2 =0 .87 σ =0 .034 DW =2 .15
where rq,t ≡ 1




t are the UK 3-month interest rate, quarterly CPI
inﬂation rate, foreign real interest rate, respectively, all (approximately) measured as quarterly
rates. The instruments are four lags of the real eﬀective exchange rate, UK 3-month interest
rate, US federal funds rate, quarterly CPI inﬂation rate and OECD output gap. We found that
the residuals were modelled well by an AR(1) process as additional lags where insigniﬁcant.
Although imprecisely estimated, the interest rate term has a coeﬃcient that is almost equal to
the theoretical expected value of unity. Similarly, the coeﬃcient on the forward exchange rate
9term is also almost 1, also as expected from theory. By constraining the coeﬃcients to 1, the
preferred model is given by












q,t−3 + wt (17)
¯ R2 =0 .85 σ =0 .037 DW =2 .12
and the foreign real interest rate is approximated best by an AR(3) process.





t−1 + ξt (18)
¯ R2 =0 .25 σ =0 .005 DW =2 .14
4. Policy analysis
In this section we start by giving a description of the transmission mechanism of the model by
considering the a disinﬂationary experiment, unexpectedly lowering the inﬂation target by once
percentage point, assuming that policy is implemented through a forecast-feedback rule. We
then consider the conﬁguration of the rule parameters from two perspectives. First, we infer
what conﬁgurations (if any) of the rule yield a determinate rational expectations equilibrium.
Second, we infer among the rule conﬁgurations which yield a rational expectations equilibrium
whether the rule may come close to replicating the outcome of the optimal commitment policy.
4.1. A disinﬂationary experiment
Figure 1 shows the response of key variables to an unexpected reduction in the inﬂation target
for the UIF and PCF rules. We assume a forecast feedback horizon of eight quarters, which
seems reasonable given the statements by the central bankers quoted in the introduction. Note
that variables are measured relative to their new steady-state values. We assume that the
policymaker set ρ =0 .95 and β =6 .25 in case of the UIF rule and ρ =0 .8a n dβ = 10 for the
PCF rules.9
The announcement of the a lower inﬂation target makes private agents reduce their inﬂation
expectations which lead to an increase in the real interest rate. The unchanged-interest-rate
brings about an undershooting of the inﬂation target at the relevant horizon and the nominal
interest rate is gradually lowered. Lower expectations about future inﬂation implies expectations
of a lower price level. Thus the nominal exchange rate appreciates immediately and depreciate
toward its new steady-state growth path. As there are expectations of future positive real
9Section 4.3 will show that these coeﬃcients determine the rational expectations equilibrium and produce the
least loss with the given forecast-feedback horizon.
10Figure 1
The response to an unexpected reduction in the inﬂation target with H =8 .
(a) The UIF rule (b) The PCF rule
interest rate (diﬀerentials), the real exchange rate appreciates at the time of announcement and
then depreciates at a rate equal to the real interest rate diﬀerential. The increase in the real
interest rate and the temporary real appreciation lower the output gap over a period of three
years. Also after three years, CPI inﬂation is approximately back on target. Figure 4.2(b)
shows that the responses under a PCF rule are quite similar, albeit somewhat stronger as the
interest rate reacts somewhat more aggressively to the disinﬂation shock.
The similarity between the responses is dependent on the coeﬃcients being optimally se-
lected. Figure C1 in the appendix shows the response under the PCF rule with the coeﬃcient
for the UIF rule, stated above. In this regard, the implied responses from the two rules are quite
diﬀerent at a horizon of eight quarters. In the stated case, the PCF rule causes overstabilization
and cyclical evolvement in the model.
The disinﬂation experiment illustrates that the forecast-feedback horizon may deviate sub-
stantially for the policy target horizon; it always takes longer time than the forecast-feedback
horizon to bring inﬂation back to its target in steady state. The exact size of the deviation is,
however, dependent on the conﬁguration of the rule as well as the type of shock the economy
is subject to.
4.2. Determinacy
We now consider the issue of whether the forecast feedback rules determine the rational expecta-
tions (RE) equilibrium. Blanchard and Kahn (1980) show that in order for the RE equilibrium
to be determined, we need that there are as many unstable eigenvalues as there are forward-
looking variables in the model. This turns out to be an important issue for the forecast-feedback
rules as this requirement is not met for an a large set of parameter values. Figures 2 and 3 show
the conﬁgurations of parameters in the rule that determines the RE equilibrium, denoted by a
value of unity, for the UIF rule and PCF rules, respectively. There are at least three important
11Figure 2
Parameter determinacy region for the UIF rule at diﬀerent forecast-feedback horizons.
observations to be made.
First, the length of the forecast-feedback horizon is important for determinacy. We consider
horizons between zero and twelve quarters and the the region of determinacy decreases as the
horizon increases. The requirement for determinacy is often stated as the Taylor principle
(Woodford, 2001) which means that the nominal interest rate needs to react suﬃciently to
increased inﬂation expectations to raise the real interest rate. Note that the real interest rate is
determined by next-period inﬂation expectations and a reaction to inﬂation expectations in the
more distant future may not suﬃce to raise the real interest rate. Hence, a long forecast-feedback
horizon may fail to determine the RE equilibrium.
Second, a higher value of βπ is likely to produce indeterminacy. The reason is that the rule
causes inﬂation to undershoot the target at the relevant horizon and a strong response is likely
to lower nominal interest rate and therefore real rates in the event of an inﬂationary shock. A
larger value of ρr reduces the response to future inﬂation for a given choice of βπ and therefore
contributes to determinacy.
Third, the region for determinacy is smaller for the UIF rule than for the PCF rule. Indeter-
minacy is evident for some choices of (βπ,ρ r) starting at a horizon of ﬁve quarters with regards
to the UIF rule, and at six quarters for the PCF rule. In general, the region of determinacy
seems larger for the PCF rule than for the UIF rule.
12Figure 3
Parameter determinacy region for the PCF rule at diﬀerent forecast feedback horizons.
4.3. Optimality
The policymaker chooses the triplet {H,β,ρr} so as to produce a determinate rational expec-
tations equilibrium and minimize expected loss, as stated in equation (2). We use a grid-search
over the values of the triplet that produce a determinate RE equilibrium with a mask-width of
0.05 for ρr and 0.25 for βπ. We assume that the policymaker is a ﬂexible inﬂation targeter that
set λ =0 .50 and ν =0 .25. The optimal coeﬃcients at diﬀerent horizons and the associated
standard deviations and loss are presented in Table 1.
Several results are worth noting. First, we ﬁnd that the optimal forecast-feedback horizon is
between one and two years. The optimal horizon for the UIF rule is only a quarter shorter than
the optimal horizon for the PCF rule. Moreover, the optimal coeﬃcients and the properties
for the two rules are very similar at short horizons. Given the high degree of inertia in the
model, the diﬀerence between the assumption of a unchanged-interest-rate and policy-consistent
inﬂation forecast is minor if the forecast-feedback horizon is relatively short. For horizons
above seven quarters, there are important diﬀerences, however. The optimal coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, with the policy-consistent rule being the most “active”. The PCF rule
weakly dominates the UIF rule at all horizons considered, and the consequences of a long
forecast-targeting horizon are more severe for the UIF rule, with strong volatility in inﬂation
and output. In this regards, the PCF rule is more robust than the UIF rule with respect to
choosing a the forecast-feedback horizon as loss is more independent of this particular choice.
13Table 1
Unconditional standard deviations in per cent and losses.a
Hβ ρ r ¯ πx∆rqs L (.5,.25) L(.5,.1)
UIF rule
01 .00 0.95 2.97 9.69 0.15 31.99 22.24 51.32 51.32
11 .00 0.95 3.02 9.68 0.14 32.01 22.26 51.39 51.39
21 .00 0.95 3.24 9.49 0.15 32.31 22.29 50.28 50.27
31 .00 0.95 3.68 9.16 0.15 32.85 22.33 48.73 48.73
41 .00 0.95 4.41 8.73 0.16 33.67 22.41 47.83 47.83
52 .75 0.35 3.18 8.91 2.51 32.32 22.01 46.38 45.43
∗66 .00 0.75 3.42 8.30 1.31 33.13 21.84 40.73 40.47
76 .25 0.90 3.32 8.44 0.79 32.94 21.83 41.32 41.23
86 .25 0.95 3.05 9.13 0.58 32.07 21.89 46.41 46.36
91 .00 0.30 7.15 7.91 0.54 37.13 21.69 56.85 56.81
10 1.00 0.70 9.17 8.31 0.49 39.51 22.21 76.66 76.63
11 1.00 0.40 25.59 22.47 0.75 57.77 27.72 579.94 579.85
12 1.00 0.05 44.57 55.80 0.82 35.57 37.57 2550.21 2550.11
PCF rule
01 .00 0.95 2.97 9.69 0.15 31.99 22.24 51.32 51.32
11 .00 0.95 3.02 9.68 0.14 32.01 22.26 51.39 51.39
21 .00 0.95 3.24 9.49 0.15 32.31 22.29 50.28 50.27
31 .00 0.95 3.68 9.16 0.15 32.85 22.33 48.73 48.73
41 .00 0.95 4.41 8.73 0.16 33.67 22.41 47.82 47.82
52 .50 0.10 3.17 9.00 2.41 32.22 22.05 46.99 46.12
64 .50 0.10 3.42 8.28 2.30 33.09 21.83 41.42 40.63
∗78 .75 0.65 3.55 8.10 0.98 33.44 21.83 39.35 39.21
81 0 .00 0.80 3.45 8.26 0.79 33.22 21.85 40.24 40.15
98 .25 0.85 3.17 8.79 0.66 32.52 21.87 43.73 43.67
10 7.00 0.90 3.01 9.60 0.50 31.47 21.88 50.69 50.66
11 7.50 0.95 3.93 11.04 0.49 29.74 21.80 68.78 68.75
12 2.50 0.95 5.58 14.83 0.34 26.64 22.77 125.51 125.49
Optimal commitment rule λ =0 .50 ν =0 .25
−− − 4.90 5.70 3.26 36.60 21.19 30.92 9 .30
Optimal commitment rule λ =0 .45b ν =0 .10
−− − 4.77 5.58 4.36 36.70 21.05 31.68 28.82
a First three columns show the optimal conﬁguration for policy rule at diﬀerent forecast-feedback horizons. The next
ﬁve columns show the standard deviations of respective variables, and the last two columns show expected losses.
b The numerical routine fails to solve for the commitment policy equilibrium for λ =0 .50 and ν =0 .10.
The optimal choice of coeﬃcients involves considerable interest-rate inertia at most horizons,
with ρr being close to unity. The optimality of interest-rate inertia in forward-looking models
is discussed in Woodford (2003). Such inertia, or history-dependence, inﬂuences private-sector
expectations about the future as a given monetary-policy stance is expected to prevail. The
ability to aﬀect expectations about the future will enhance the central banks ability to inﬂuence
private-sector behavior today because agents act in a forward-looking manner.
Inﬂation targeting is associated with extensive use of the exchange-rate channel. Real
exchange-rate volatility is slightly smaller for the forecast-feedback rules compared to the opti-
mal commitment policy, so the source of the volatility is not the forecast-feedback rules. It is
14Figure 4
The trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output volatility under optimized UIF (left) and
PCF (right) rules and the optimal commitment rule with λ ∈ [0,1] and ν =0 .25.
known that price stickiness on imported goods lead to more exchange-rate variability under in-
ﬂation targeting (see Adolfson (2001)). The reason is that since prices are subject to stickiness,
imported goods prices respond less to any shocks that cause a movement in the exchange rate.
Hence, exchange rate stability is not such an important requirement for inﬂation and output
stability as it is if prices on the imported goods are ﬂexible.
Figure 4.3 shows the combinations of the standard deviations of inﬂation and output for
the optimal forecast-feedback rules at diﬀerent horizons, in addition to the optimal trade-oﬀ
generated by the optimal commitment policy - referred to as the policy eﬃciency frontier.10
As is clear from Figure 4.3, the both policy rules are close to the policy eﬃciency frontier.
Still, from Table 1 we see that the optimal forecast-feedback rules generate loss that are as much
as 30 per cent worse than the optimal commitment policy. Reducing the weight on interest-
rate smoothing to ν =0 .1 have virtually no eﬀect on this result. Relative to the optimal
commitment policy, the forecast-feedback rules generate too much inﬂation stabilization and
interest-rate smoothing, and too little output-gap stability. This result conﬁrms and extends
the result in Levin et al. (2001) for the relatively closed US economy who argue that the rule
performance of the rule can be signiﬁcantly improved is extended with a response to the output
gap. In this regard, neither rules are as “output encompassing” as claimed by Batini and
Haldane (1999).
In order to illustrate this even further, we can vary the weight on inﬂation and output
stabilization in the loss function and see how this inﬂuences the choice of horizon and the
eﬃciency of the policy rules. Table 2 shows the optimal horizon and loss relative to the optimal
commitment policy for diﬀerent conﬁgurations of λ ∈{ 0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8}.
10The policy eﬃciency frontier is constructed by plotting the unconditional standard deviations of inﬂation
and output generated by the optimal commitment policy when λ varies between 0 and 1.
15Table 2
Central bank preferences and optimal rule conﬁgurations.a
λβ ρ r HL (λ,.25) Lr
UIF rule
0.26 .25 0.90 7 23.23 2.07%
0.45 .00 0.70 6 34.98 17.86%
0.67 .75 0.80 6 46.43 48.67%
0.87 .75 0.80 6 57.77 100.38%
PCF rule
0.24 .25 0.45 7 23.14 1.67%
0.47 .00 0.65 7 34.05 15.38%
0.68 .75 0.65 7 44.65 42.97%
0.88 .75 0.65 7 55.24 91.61%
a Table shows optimal rule conﬁgurations for diﬀerent weight on inﬂation versus output stabilization. L denotes expected
loss and Lr ≡
(L−Lc)
Lc 100 loss relative to loss under optimal commitment policy, in percent.
We can see that both rules can bring the outcome close to the optimal commitment policy
outcome if the central bank is relatively strict on inﬂation, loss being only 2.07 and 1.67 per cent
worse for the two rules respectively. Eﬃciency of both rules, however, deteriorates very quickly
as the relative weight on the output gap is increased. Interestingly, the optimal forecast-feedback
horizon is robustly around one and a half year for both rules. The optimized coeﬃcients remain
more stable for the UIF rule and for the PCF rule as the weight is changed.
5. Conclusion
This paper has evaluated inﬂation forecast-feedback rules in an estimated, micro-founded model
of the UK economy. We ﬁnd that these rules are eﬃcient in that they bring inﬂation and output
close to the optimal policy inﬂation-output variance frontier. These rules are in general better
at stabilizing inﬂation than output, as the output gap is considerably more volatile than in the
optimal policy commitment equilibrium. The optimal forecast-feedback horizon is surprisingly
stable at six or seven quarters, and independent of the weight the central bank attaches to inﬂa-
tion versus output stabilization. A potential problem with both forecast-feedback rules is that
the rules do not necessarily ensure determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium. This
problem is especially acute at long forecast-feedback horizons where the set of rule parameters
that brings determinacy is quite small.
We ﬁnd that the forecast-feedback rule that using an unchanged-interest-rate forecast of
inﬂation does in general decrease the parameter determinacy space, and does not improve on
the performance of the rule. The implied dynamics of the rules do, however, diﬀer importantly
when the central bank applies a long forecast-feedback horizon.
16Appendix
A. Analytical derivation of policy with the constant-interest-rate forecasts as
the indicator
This subsection derives the UIF policy in a general dynamic model. An important and large class of
dynamic models can be set in the following state-space form:
Zt+1 = AZt + Brt + εt+1, (A1)
where A is the companion matrix and B is a vector of interest-rate impact multipliers; Z is a vector of
state variables. Using repeated substitutions, we can write the expected value of the state vector at time
t + h made at time t as




Providing that the interest rate level in the previous period being kept throughout the forecast horizon,





Assume that the state vector includes the relevant variables so we can set
¯ πt ≡ KπZt, (A3)
rt−1 ≡ KrZt. (A4)
for appropriately deﬁned Kπ and Kr. We can then insert (A3) and (A4) into (A2) to get the unchanged-
interest-rate forecast of the four-quarter inﬂation rate as
¯ πt+h|t(¯ rt−1)=KπZt+h|t(¯ rt−1)




The inﬂation forecast feedback rule is given from (4),
rt = ρrrt−1 +( 1− ρr)βπ¯ πt+h|t(¯ rt−1),
where π∗ =0 . Using (A3), (A4) and (A5), this rule may be written as a function of the state vector as
rt = FZt, (A6)
where F = ρrKr +( 1− ρr)βπKπAh +( 1− ρr)Kπ
 h
i=1 Ah−iBKr.
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where the C-matrix is deﬁned accordingly.
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) show that the rational expectations equilibrium is unique if the number
of eigenvalues of C outside the unit circle is equal to the number of forward-looking variables. The
forward-looking variables may then be written as a linear function of the predetermined variables,
z2,t = Hz1,t. (A9)
The H is a function of the underlying model coeﬃcient and can be found by applying the techniques
discussed Klein (2000) and S¨ oderlind (1999).
Note that in equilibrium, the interest rate follows
it =( F1 + F2H)z1,t.
18B. Analytical derivation of policy with the policy-consistent forecasts as the
indicator
See also Rudebusch and Svensson (1999, Appendix).
B.1. The case of H =4
We ﬁrst use that
πt+4|t ≡ eπ,3Zt+1|t
where eπ,j is appropriately deﬁned vectors so that πt+j|t ≡ eπ,jZt. We then take expectations in equation
(A1) and get Zt+1|t = AZt + Brt. Furthermore, the PCF rule is given by




πt+4|t + πt+3|t + πt+2|t + πt+1|t
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By using the rule and the expression for Zt+1|t,w eg e t
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Zt
where er is deﬁned so that rt−1 = erZt.
The model can then be written with endogenous interest rate as
Zt+1|t = AZt + Brt
= AZt + B
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Zt+1|t = ˜ AZt
and
Zt+1 = ˜ AZt + Vt+1
19where
˜ A ≡ A + Bρrer + B(1 − ρr)βπ
1
4
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B.2. The case of H>4
We note that
πt+4|t = eπ,3Zt+1|t
= eπ,3 (AZt + Brt)
= eπ,3AZt + eπ,3B
 




πt+H|t + πt+H−1|t + πt+H−2|t + πt+H−3|t
  
= eπ,3(A + Bρrer)Zt + eπ,3B(1 − ρr)βπ
1
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πt+H−1|t + πt+H−2|t + πt+H−3|t
 
The basis model in state-space is given as
Zt+1 = AZt + Brt + Vt+1
20and with the rule and the expression for πt+H|t inserted,
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The expanded model is the basis model augmented by forward-looking variables representing the
forecasts at diﬀerent horizons. The augmented vector of variables are given as
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢










⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥





⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎣
A11 A12 00 0 0
00 1 0 0 0
00 0 I 00
00 0 0 1 0
00 0 0 0 1
A61 A62 0 −1 −1 −1
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
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The response to an unexpected reduction in the inﬂation
target under PCF rule policy with H =8 ,ρ =0 .95 and
β =6 .25.
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